A majority of Americans now support a youth social media ban. And they aren't alone: 26 countries have already implemented, passed, or are actively debating similar legislation.

—Pew Research Center

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It's no secret that many parents are concerned about how much time young people spend online. Now, a majority of Americans want government action. According to a new Pew survey, 56% of US adults support banning social media for children under 16, while just 21% oppose such legislation.

By demographic group, parents with children under age 18 are, unsurprisingly, the strongest supporters of a ban (65%). Adults ages 30–49 rank second (63%). This cohort is not only the most likely to be raising young children, but it was also the first generation to grow up alongside social media. As a result, many have firsthand experience with its downsides.

Support also spans the political spectrum. Republicans are somewhat more likely than Democrats to favor a ban (59% vs. 54%), but majorities of both parties support the idea. In an era of deep political polarization, tech-lash is one of the few issues that commands broad bipartisan agreement. (See “Tech-Lash Intensifies.”)

Because this is the first time Pew has asked about a youth social media ban, it's impossible to say whether support has risen or fallen over time. However, Pew has found growing support over the past three years for policies such as parental consent requirements, age verification, and time-limit settings.

Around the world, seven countries have already implemented youth social media bans, with Australia the most prominent Western example. Three others, including France and the United Kingdom, have passed similar legislation but have yet to enforce it. Another 15 countries, along with the European Union, are actively debating comparable proposals.

Enforcement may prove difficult, but the political momentum is unmistakable. Parents are demanding action, and governments are increasingly willing to act.

Between 2000 and 2025, US real GDP grew by +69.2%. Yet the gains were far from evenly distributed.

Draw a line down the middle of the country between Minnesota and the Dakotas, and you'll find that states in the western half generally experienced much stronger economic growth than those in the eastern half.

Draw another line at the southern border of Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia—and now look at all 22 states in the northeastern quadrant. Not one of them experienced growth at or above the national average. In all the other 28 states, 19 were above average, and sometimes far above.

Fastest-Growing States

• North Dakota: +154%

• Utah: +144%

• Texas: 130%

• Washington: +120%

• Idaho: +104%

Slowest-Growing States

• West Virginia: +31%

• Rhode Island: +31%

• Louisiana: +25%

• Connecticut: +25%

• Michigan: +21%

Americans have lost faith in many of the nation's core institutions. What’s more, the partisan divide has never been wider.

—Gallup

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Back in the mid-1960s, near the end of the American High, roughly 70% to 80% of Americans trusted major institutions, including the federal government, to do what was right. By the late 1970s, following Watergate and the withdrawal from Vietnam, trust had already fallen sharply. But the decline didn't stop there.

Since 1979, Gallup has measured Americans' trust in nine core US institutions, ranging from Congress and newspapers to organized religion and big business. In 2026, just 27% of U.S. adults said they had "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in these institutions. That's down -9 percentage points from 2020 (36%) and -21 percentage points from 1979 (48%).

Between 1979 and 2000, Republicans and Democrats held largely similar views. But beginning in 2001, confidence started to diverge depending on which party controlled the White House. Republicans expressed greater confidence during the Bush and Trump administrations, while Democrats were more confident during the Obama and Biden administrations. Today, Republicans are the more confident of the two groups (36% vs. 23%), and the partisan gap has reached a record 13 percentage points.

This survey simply confirms what we've been documenting for years: American pessimism is high, institutional perceptions have become increasingly partisan, and yes, the Fourth Turning is here. (See “Trust in US Institutions Remains Low.”)

Over the last 50 years, US ice cream consumption has steadily declined. In 1975, the average American consumed 18.2 pounds of ice cream. In 2025, that figure fell to only 12.0 pounds. That’s a -34.1% decline.

So what’s behind this drop in consumption? There are two main drivers.

• Health Concerns: Americans of all ages are cutting back on high-glycemic foods, while a growing share of younger consumers are also concerned about lactose intolerance and dairy additives. (See “Dairy Industry Is Courting Young People.”) There is also early evidence that the growing use of GLP-1 medications is reducing demand for sugary treats.

• Premium Offerings: Consumers have shifted toward smaller containers of high-end ice cream. Instead of buying a family-size tub of vanilla or chocolate, many are opting for a pint of Ben & Jerry's Phish Food. In other words, when they do eat ice cream, they're eating smaller portions.

Over the last two decades, Americans have spent less and less time socializing. The decline has been especially steep among young people.

—BLS

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The BLS just released the results of its 2025 American Time Use Survey. As we continue to analyze the data, one trend already stands out: Americans are spending less time together.

In 2003, Americans ages 15 and older spent an average of 47 minutes per day socializing face-to-face. By 2025, that had fallen to just 35 minutes, a decline of 12 minutes, or -26%.

While a 12-minute decline may not seem dramatic, the drop among young people has been far steeper. In 2003, Americans ages 15–24 spent an average of 61 minutes per day socializing. By 2025, that figure had fallen to just 35 minutes, a decline of 26 minutes, or -43%.

In fact, young adults recorded the largest decline in face-to-face socializing of any age group, both in absolute minutes and percentage terms. Americans aged 55-64 now spend more time hanging out than teenagers (40 minutes vs. 35 minutes).

So what’s behind this decline? The most obvious factor is the proliferation of smartphones, social media, and digital entertainment. Young people, in particular, now spend a significant share of their free time online: One Gallup poll found that teens spend an average of 4.8 hours per day on social media.

Another factor is the decline of “third places,” the spots outside the home and workplace where people gather, build friendships, and strengthen their communities. A recent analysis by Bloomberg found that over the last two decades, the US has lost over 2,000 golf courses and 7,000 bars. As these venues disappear, opportunities for casual face-to-face interaction diminish.

I suspect this trend will eventually reverse. Historically, periods of crisis have encouraged people to rebuild local institutions and reconnect with their communities. As we approach the apex of the current Fourth Turning, people will naturally band together.

And there are early signs of that shift taking place. For example, the Catholic Church has reported a notable increase in young men attending services, many of whom say they are searching for purpose and belonging—and, above all, community. (See “A New Religious Divide: Young Men vs. Young Women.”)

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The CDC just released state total fertility rates for 2024. The highest rates were concentrated in the American heartland: Kentucky (1.80), North Dakota (1.81), Idaho (1.82), Nebraska (1.92), and South Dakota (2.04).

These states tend to be more socially conservative, with higher levels of religiosity and younger ages at first marriage. They also generally have lower costs of living and more affordable housing, making it easier for families to have children. (See “2026 US Demography Review.”)

In contrast, the lowest fertility rates were concentrated along the West Coast and in the Northeast: Massachusetts (1.38), Oregon (1.36), New Hampshire (1.35), Rhode Island (1.33), and Vermont (1.27). The District of Columbia had the nation’s lowest TFR at just 1.11. That’s 0.49 children below the national figure, 1.60. (Of course, many young people move out of cities to start a family.)

These states tend to have some of the nation’s highest housing costs and living expenses, making it more difficult for young families to afford children.

Middle America also recorded the largest year-over-year increases in fertility: Idaho (+0.03), Colorado (+0.04), Montana (+0.04), and South Dakota (+0.04).

Meanwhile, the largest declines were concentrated in the Mid-Atlantic and Gulf Coast: Mississippi (-0.05), Florida (-0.05), Louisiana (-0.06), New Jersey (-0.06), and the District of Columbia (-0.09).

Less than 20% of Americans think the Founding Fathers would be proud of the country today. While all political parties hold a pessimistic view, Democrats are the most negative.

—Gallup

Every year, as the 4th of July approaches, survey outlets publish poll results on American patriotism. The further we enter the Fourth Turning, the more negative these results have become. Last year, only 58% of US adults said they were "extremely or very proud" to be US citizens. That’s the lowest reading on record. (See “Patriotism Hits New Low.”)

This year, to celebrate the 250th anniversary of America, Gallup revived a question it hadn’t asked since 2013: Do you think the signers of the Declaration of Independence would be pleased or disappointed by the way the United States has turned out?

As you may have guessed, the answer wasn’t positive. Only 19% of Americans believe the Founders would be pleased with America today. That’s an -8 percentage point decline from 2013 (27%) and a whopping -35 percentage point decline from the record high reached in 2001 (54%).

By political affiliation, Democrats are the most pessimistic. Just 13% believe the Founders would be proud of America, down -29 percentage points since 2013. Among independents, 21% agree, a modest 3-point decline. Republicans are the most optimistic at 25%, up +13 points from 2013 when Obama was in office, but still down -32 points from their 2003 peak.

These results add more evidence that Americans are highly pessimistic about the state of the country. And as the Fourth Turning marches on, we suspect these indicators will further deteriorate.

Support for gay marriage has fallen for the third consecutive year. Much of the shift has been driven by Republicans, though support has also softened among independents.

—Gallup

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Licensed franchises now account for a third of global toy sales. From Pokémon to Jurassic Park, toy companies are increasingly selling nostalgia alongside play.

—The Economist

It often feels like every new movie or television show is a remake, reboot, or sequel. Now that same shift toward established intellectual property is reshaping the toy industry. According to Circana, the share of global toy sales tied to licensed IP has grown from 25% to 37% since 2018. That’s an increase of +12 percentage points.

Perhaps no company embodies this trend more than Lego. Just this month, it announced new Pokémon-themed “smart” sets. The toy maker has spent years expanding beyond its original themes, partnering with franchises ranging from Star Wars and Harry Potter to Minecraft and Fortnite. Circana estimates that more than 50% of Lego’s $13B annual revenue comes from licensed IP.

But Lego is hardly alone. Funko’s Pop! vinyl figurines depict everyone from Happy Gilmore to Freddie Mercury. Hasbro sells Monopoly boards based on franchises like X-Men and Dune. And Magic: The Gathering includes crossover sets featuring Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles, Monty Python, and dozens of other well-known brands.

On the surface, the appeal of licensed IP is obvious: Established franchises come with loyal fan bases. And as moated franchises scale ever larger with fans who never outgrow their pop-culture obsessions, entire industries of brand merch—from books and toys to clothing, snacks, and theme parks—grow along with them.

But the toy industry is also capitalizing on the nostalgia clinging to many of these brands. While some products are tied to newer hits like Bluey, many draw on franchises that are more than 30 years old, like Jurassic Park and The X-Files. These toys allow parents to introduce their children to the characters they grew up with, while also appealing to adult collectors. (See “Board Games Make a Comeback” and “Lego: New Stress Reliever for Adults.”)

Remember, toys are no longer just for children. As Millennials and Gen Xers continue to spend on the franchises of their youth, toy companies are finding that nostalgia can be just as profitable as attracting the next generation of fans.

Prediction markets have grown nearly 30-fold over the last two years. Sports betting is driving much of that expansion.

—Pew Research Center

In the months leading up to the 2024 presidential election, prediction markets went from a niche curiosity to a mainstream obsession. Many observers argued that the “wisdom of the crowd” might prove more reliable than traditional polling. In the end, prediction markets favored Trump, even as most polls showed Kamala Harris holding a narrow lead.

Since then, prediction markets have exploded in popularity. According to a new Pew report, combined global trading volume on Kalshi and Polymarket International, the world’s two largest prediction markets, totaled $810.2 million in July 2024. By April 2026, that figure had surged to $23.8 billion, an increase of 2,838% in less than two years.

Despite the attention prediction markets receive for political forecasting, sports betting is the industry’s primary growth engine. Since July 2024, sports-related contracts have accounted for 39% of all trading volume on Polymarket and an even larger 80% on Kalshi. Politics ranks second on Polymarket, making up 32% of trading volume, compared with just 7% on Kalshi.

Sports and political markets are highly event-driven. Trading activity tends to surge around major elections, championship games, and other headline-making events.

Prediction markets are increasingly competing with online sportsbooks like FanDuel and DraftKings. Unlike traditional sportsbooks, they can operate in states where sports betting is still illegal, such as California. They also appeal to newcomers by stripping away much of the jargon. Rather than navigating point spreads, parlays, and complex odds, users typically make a simple binary prediction: who wins and who loses. (See “Sharps and Beards: The Wacky World of Online Sports Betting.”)

The threat is significant enough that DraftKings has launched its own prediction market platform. Despite the move, the company's stock has fallen more than 30% over the past year. For now, investors view prediction markets as a disruptive force rather than a complementary product.

Empty-nest Boomers now own more large homes than Millennial families. And the forces driving that trend could persist for decades.

—Redfin

According to a new analysis of Census data by Redfin, Baby Boomers own the largest share of America’s biggest homes. Boomers living in one- or two-person households own 28% of homes with three or more bedrooms. By comparison, Millennials with children own just 16% of such large homes. That’s a difference of 12 percentage points.

Across all household types, Boomers own 35.3% of large homes, followed by Gen X at 31.2%, and Millennials at 23.8%.

So why do Boomers still own so many big houses?

We’ve often written about Boomers’ tendency to “age in place.” (See “The Death of Senior Housing” and “Why Americans Are Spending More On Home Improvement.”) Unlike the GI Generation, which was more willing to embrace retirement communities, Boomers have shown a strong preference for staying put. Many want to remain near their children and grandchildren. Others continue to support multigenerational households or remain employed well past traditional retirement age. As a result, many Boomers continue to occupy the large homes in which they raised their families.

There is also a financial component. Many Boomers have either paid off their mortgages entirely or locked in low interest rates back in the 2010s. As a result, they have little economic incentive to sell. At the same time, many Millennials struggle to afford large homes when they do come onto the market.

Of course, this imbalance will not last forever. Many Millennials will eventually inherit these homes as their Boomer parents pass away. And some are already living in these homes. But the youngest large “baby boom” cohort, born in 1964, will not enter their high-mortality years until the late 2040s. In fact—and this comes from the SSA’s Longevity Visualizer—half of all couples born in 1964 won’t both be deceased until the year 2056. By that time (gulp!) the oldest Millennials will be in their early 70s.

So no, the imbalance won’t last forever. But unless something else changes, the demographic forces keeping large homes off the market today may remain in place for decades. (See “Who Will Buy All the Boomer Homes?”)

Public opposition to AI data centers is rapidly rising across the political spectrum. Americans increasingly fear the strain these facilities could place on water supplies, power grids, and local utility bills.

—Gallup

According to Pew, 38% of Americans now live within five miles of a data center. For years, local governments largely viewed these sprawling facilities as economic wins. But as the AI boom accelerates and new projects spread across the country, public sentiment is rapidly turning negative. A new poll from Gallup reveals just how strong the backlash has become.

Fully 72% of US adults now oppose the construction of AI data centers in their local communities. That includes 23% who say they “somewhat oppose” new development and 48% who say they “strongly oppose” it. By contrast, only about one-quarter of Americans support building new facilities nearby.

The backlash is remarkably bipartisan. Democrats and independents are the most resistant to new construction, with 75% and 74% opposed, respectively. But Republicans are not far behind: fully 63% also oppose building new AI data centers in their communities.

That growing resistance is now beginning to spill into the midterms. Candidates from both parties are increasingly questioning the generous tax breaks, subsidies, and energy deals once used to attract data center projects.

So what’s driving the backlash? Much of the opposition centers on the strain data centers place on local infrastructure. Fully 18% of Americans cite concerns about water usage, while another 18% worry about energy consumption and pressure on the electrical grid. An additional 15% specifically fear that new facilities could drive up utility bills.

But the backlash also reflects growing skepticism toward AI itself. About 12% say they oppose new construction because they fear AI will replace human workers, while another 10% say they simply dislike AI altogether. Pew has been tracking overall favorability toward AI since 2021. Among voters is both parties, opinion has clearly been shifting from “excited” to “concerned.”

When we look around the world at attitudes toward AI in other countries, a paradoxical picture emerges: Among 25 nations surveyed by Pew, American adults are the most negative about AI, despite the face that the US economy stands to benefit the most from AI’s global success. This may simply reflect the fact that Americans have more up-close contact with AI. Or that countries with low institutional trust are more fearful about any change that may benefit one group over another.

Over the years, we’ve written several NewsWires about the growing techlash in America. But much of that backlash was aimed at social media companies. (See “Tech-Lash Intensifies” and “Americans Don’t Trust Big Tech.”) Now, AI is emerging as the new villain. Silicon Valley and Wall Street may be sold, but the public isn’t buying it. Just look at the wave of viral videos from this year’s college commencements, where speakers were booed after they declared that AI is the future. Back in the late-1990s, youth were mostly enthusiastic about the dot.com craze. No replay of that here.

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Americans are increasingly disconnected from their neighborhoods. Young adults, in particular, are far less likely to interact with their neighbors than they were a decade ago.

—Survey Center on American Life

According to a new report from the Survey Center on American Life, Americans are interacting with their neighbors less often. In 2012, 59% of US adults said they spoke with their neighbors at least a few times a week. Today, just 40% say the same. That’s a -19 percentage point decline.

The drop in interaction has been especially sharp among young adults. Over the past 13 years, the share of 18- to 29-year-olds who talk with their neighbors weekly has fallen -26 percentage points to just 25%. By comparison, the share of adults aged 65 and older who regularly speak with their neighbors has declined only -7 percentage points to 56%.

The survey also found that college-educated Americans are more engaged with their neighbors than those without a degree. Compared to non-college graduates, they are more likely to work with neighbors to solve local problems (46% vs. 34%), socialize with neighbors (58% vs. 46%), and exchange texts or emails with them (65% vs. 45%).

Importantly, these gaps persist even after controlling for whether respondents live in urban, suburban, or rural areas. The findings align with other recent surveys we’ve covered, which found that working-class Americans are more likely to report smaller social circles and weaker personal support networks than white-collar workers. (See “Divided by Wealth: How Class Shapes Our Friendships.”)

So what do Americans think makes a good neighbor? According to the survey, 65% say it means “not getting too involved in your neighbors’ personal affairs.” Only 33% say being a good neighbor means offering help even when it isn’t requested.

Views also differ sharply by age. Among young adults, 70% say good neighbors should stay out of personal matters, compared to just 57% of seniors. That’s a gap of 13 percentage points.

All in all, the report adds to a growing body of evidence that many Americans, especially younger Americans, are becoming increasingly isolated. (See “All the Lonely People” and “Where Have All Our Friends Gone?”) Traditional sources of community and social support, from churches to labor unions, have steadily lost influence over the past several decades. Now, even the most basic form of community, relationships with the people living next door, is fading.

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Most Americans now believe self-driving cars will become commonplace within the next decade. But despite growing expectations for adoption, public trust in the technology remains low.

—Gallup

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According to a new Gallup survey, Americans increasingly believe that self-driving cars are the future of transportation. Fully 31% of US adults believe driverless cars will be commonly used within the next five years. That’s a +12 percentage point increase from 2018, when just 19% said the same.

An additional 34% believe autonomous vehicles will become commonplace within the next decade. Altogether, 65% of Americans expect driverless vehicles to be widely used within 10 years.

But that doesn’t mean Americans are eager to buy one themselves. Just 19% say they would purchase a self-driving car if the technology became widely available within the next 20 years, unchanged from 2018. Meanwhile, 73% say they would still prefer a vehicle they personally drive, statistically unchanged from seven years ago (75%).

In fact, Americans are now more—not less—concerned about the safety of driverless cars. In 2018, 47% said the safest roads would be those with mostly or entirely human-operated vehicles. Today, that figure has climbed to 58%, up +11 percentage points.

Driverless car companies are quick to argue that autonomous vehicles are safer than human drivers. But many industry experts remain skeptical that the data fully reflect how these systems would perform at scale. Over the years, we have also questioned whether the technology is truly ready for widespread adoption. (See “Americans Grow Cold on Self-Driving Cars” and “Self-Driving Cars Still Stuck in Neutral.”)

The public’s hesitation has likely been reinforced by a series of high-profile incidents. Waymo, the robotaxi company owned by Alphabet, has been at the center of several viral controversies. In December, a Waymo vehicle appeared to drive through a police standoff. In January, one reportedly struck a child near a school. Then in March, another blocked an ambulance responding to a shooting scene.

If self-driving car companies want the public’s trust, it’s not enough for their vehicles to be safer on average. They also have to prove they won’t behave in ways that feel unnatural, unpredictable, or outright absurd. People can forgive human error. They are far less willing to forgive a machine driving through a police standoff.

Millennial direct-to-consumer brands once promised to disrupt retail with sleek design and viral marketing. Now, higher costs and tighter capital are exposing the limits of that model.

—The Economist

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In the late 2010s, Allbirds (BIRD) was one of the hottest Millennial brands. Its eco-friendly wool sneakers became a staple among Silicon Valley tech workers. But since going public in 2021, the company’s share price has collapsed by a whopping -99%. Now, in a last-ditch effort, it plans to sell its core footwear business and pivot toward AI. Apparently, when all else fails, just add “AI” and hope the market forgets you used to sell shoes.

But Allbirds isn’t an outlier. It’s the latest casualty in a broader pattern: the rapid rise and fall of Millennial direct-to-consumer brands.

In the 2010s, a wave of startups bet they could bypass traditional retail and sell directly online to young consumers: Casper sold online mattresses, Warby Parker glasses, Allbirds shoes, Dollar Shave Club razors, and Glossier makeup.

Just as important, they turned their customers into marketers. Sleek design and packaging fueled a constant stream of social media posts and unboxing videos, creating free advertising at scale. At their peak, many of these companies reached billion-dollar valuations.

That playbook is now breaking down, and the unwind has been swift. Casper went public in 2020, only to go private two years later after its valuation fell roughly -70%. Unilever bought Dollar Shave Club for $1 billion in 2016, then sold it in 2023 for significantly less. And Glossier has explored selling its business, but without success.

So what changed? First, the easy money disappeared. As interest rates rose, venture capital pulled back from consumer brands and shifted toward AI. At the same time, digital advertising became more expensive and saturated, eroding one of the core advantages of the direct-to-consumer model.

Competition has also intensified. A new generation of brands is being launched by celebrities and influencers who already command massive online audiences. Instead of relying on customers to generate buzz, these companies arrive with built-in distribution from day one.

The result is a far tougher landscape. Higher customer acquisition costs, tighter capital, and stronger competition are squeezing the very model that once defined Millennial consumer startups. The question is no longer whether these brands can scale. It’s whether they can survive.

Young men are reporting a sharp rise in religiosity. Young people are now the only age group in which men place greater importance on religion than women.

—Gallup

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Over the last two decades, American religiosity has steadily declined. (See “Is America Losing Its Religion?”) Church attendance has fallen, affiliation has weakened, and a growing share identify as religious “nones.” But one group is now reversing that trend: young men.

According to a new Gallup survey, in 2025, 42% of men ages 18-29 said that religion was “very important” in their lives. That’s a +14 percentage point increase since 2023, when only 28% said the same thing. Young men’s religiosity is nearly back to its 2001 level of 43%.

This surge in religion among young men stands in sharp contrast to young women. Just 29% of women ages 18–29 say religion is “very important” in their lives, a -3 percentage point decline since 2023. That leaves a striking 13-point gap between genders. In fact, young adults are now the only age group in which men report higher religious importance than women. This is a clear break from the historical norm, where women at every age have consistently expressed more interest in religion than men.

On the ground, churches are reporting a similar shift. Catholic and Orthodox congregations in particular say they are seeing an influx of men in their 20s. Anecdotally, new converts often point to a desire for community, a search for meaning beyond an increasingly digital world, and inspiration from figures like Charlie Kirk.

As the example of Kirk may suggest, many of these longings—for community, direction, inspiration—come together for young men in Christian Nationalism. A sizable share of young men has shifted toward the Republican Party in recent years, and insistence on religiosity, usually Christianity, is often tied to a conservative identity. (Just as insistence on no religiosity is tied to a progressive identity; see “More on the Widening Youth Gender Divide.”) In that sense, saying religion is “very important” or “unimportant” may function less as a reflection of your institutional religious ties and more as a signal of your tribal identity, red zone or blue zone.

The data from Gallup appears consistent with that interpretation. While the share of young men who say religion is “very important” has risen by +14 percentage points, the share attending church at least once a month has increased by just +7 points, to 40%. In other words, the rise in stated belief is outpacing the rise in behavior.

It also turns out that both young men and young women are attending church somewhat more today (2024-25) than they were a few years ago (2020-21)—again, about +7% more—though attendance by all older age groups has declined. While this is mostly among young Republicans, it can also be seen among young Democrats. So there is something of a “church revival” among young people across the board. The difference, for young conservative men, is that even those who don’t go to church embrace the identity shift. It’s a big deal. It’s “very important in my life.”

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News:

• A new report from FMI found that more than 75% of US adults now view meat and poultry as part of a healthy diet. That’s up from 64% in 2020, an +11 percentage point increase.

Trend:

• Americans are becoming increasingly focused on protein, and this shift is now showing up in policy. New federal guidelines place greater weight on red meat and dairy whi…

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According to the CDC’s preliminary 2025 birth data, US fertility continues to decline. Births are rising among older women, but falling faster among the young.

—CDC

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The US total fertility rate (TFR) fell from 1.599 in 2024 to 1.574 in 2025. That’s a -1.6% decline and, once again, the lowest reading on record. If you exclude the 2021 blip, the TFR has fallen for the last ten years.

Let’s break it down by age. The teen birth rate fell -7.1%, hitting a record low of 11.7 births per 1,000 women. Birth rates among women in their 20s also declined. But for those 30 and older, rates ticked slightly higher.

This trend towards older moms has steadily accelerated over the last 30 years. But these gains are not large enough to offset declines among younger women. For an offset to be effective, we would have to see a significant rise in the birth rate of 30-to 34-year-olds. But we aren’t seeing that. The birth rate for this group is the same in 2025 as it was in 2004. Over age 35, the absolute numbers are simply too small to matter.

We are currently preparing for our 2026 US Demography Review. And we will provide a more in-depth look at the state of US fertility. Here is a sneak peek: Don’t expect a birth rebound any time soon.

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News:

• According to Bloomberg, the US military is committing nearly its entire stockpile of JASSM-ER cruise missiles to the war with Iran. The stealth weapons are being pulled from bases across the US and Pacific. Of the roughly 2,300 prewar stockpile, just 425 will remain available for use outside the Iran conflict.

Trend:

• The US and its allies are facing …

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Time spent online is closely tied to how Americans see politics. The heaviest users consistently express the most hardline views.

—The Kettering Foundation

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According to a joint survey by the Kettering Foundation and Gallup, heavy social media use is associated with a darker and more extreme political outlook.

The divide is most visible in views on democracy. Among adults who spend an hour or less per day on social media, 73% say democracy is the best form of government. But among those who scroll for five or more hours, only 57% say the same. That’s a whopping 16 percentage point difference.

Heavy social media usage is also linked to greater tribalism. Just 21% of light users say they find it hard to get along with people who don’t share their beliefs, compared with 29% of heavy users. That’s an 8-point gap.

Most striking is the split in attitudes toward political violence. Only 9% of light users say it is sometimes acceptable to use violence to achieve political goals, versus 22% of heavy users. That’s a 13-point difference.

What explains these results? In part, it’s generational membership. Time spent on social media is a proxy forage. While this survey doesn’t provide crosstabs, we can assume heavy social media users skew young, while light users skew older. And these same divides show up consistently in age-based surveys.

In 2024, we highlighted a poll that found 42% of Americans ages 18–29 agreed that the country may need to resort to violence to get back on track, compared with just 11% of those 60+. (See “A Bleeding Ear, a Fist Pump, an Exit Post... and the Triumph of Populism.”) And a 2025 survey by the Manhattan Institute found that young people across both parties are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories, acknowledge racist views, and express negative attitudes toward minority religions.

Nevertheless, it’s easy to see how heavy social media use could reinforce more extreme views across all age groups. A small, highly vocal minority drives most online political content, and users tend to follow people they already agree with. The more time spent in that echo chamber, the more those views can harden. (See “Who’s Writing All Those Tweets?”)